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REGULATORY RESPONSES TO INVESTOR IRRATIONALITY: THE 
CASE OF THE RESEARCH ANALYST 
by                                                                                                                        
Jill E. Fisch* 
An extensive body of behavioral economics literature suggests that 
investors do not behave with perfect rationality. Instead, investors are 
subject to a variety of biases that may cause them to react 
inappropriately to information. The policy challenge posed by this 
observation is to identify the appropriate response to investor 
irrationality. In particular, should regulators attempt to protect investors 
from bad investment decisions that may be the result of irrational 
behavior?  
This Article considers the appropriate regulatory response to investor 
irrationality within the concrete context of the research analyst. Many 
commentators have argued that analyst conflicts of interest led to biased 
reports and recommendations that distorted analyst behavior. In the 
wake of the analyst scandals, regulators have responded—most recently 
by mandating increased independence. This response can be understood 
as an effort to make investor reliance reasonable. 
The Article questions this mission. In particular, the Article challenges 
the role of regulators in identifying appropriate sources of investment 
information or determining when investor behavior is rational. This 
fallibility of regulatory oversight coupled with the costs of regulation 
suggest that regulators should exercise caution, particularly in light of 
the market’s capacity to discipline investor decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s, Wall Street research analysts were powerful and 
influential. Top analysts earned multi-million dollar compensation packages. 
Leading analysts were able to “move” stock prices by announcing 
recommendations and price targets. The ability of an investment bank’s 
research department to influence investor sentiment was a key factor in the 
bank’s ability to attract underwriting business. Analysts were regularly quoted 
in the media, and television appearances by celebrity analysts, in which the 
analysts revealed their current “stock picks,” became commonplace. 
When the technology and telecommunications bubble of the late 1990s 
ended, the stock price of many issuers that had been highly touted by analysts 
began to fall. Issuers lost, in some cases, 90, 95, or even 100% of their market 
capitalization. And investors lost substantial amounts of money. 
Many hold research analysts responsible for the losses suffered by 
investors. As Senator Richard Shelby stated, “Millions of investors lost billions 
of dollars on investments that were influenced by the euphoric environment 
fostered by misleading advice.”1 Investigations have revealed that analyst 
recommendations were consistently biased and overly-optimistic. Throughout 
the 1990s, buy and strong buy recommendations dominated the market, and the 
percentage of sell recommendations dipped as low as less than one percent.2 
Analysts publicly recommended stocks that they privately believed were 
overvalued and maintained positive recommendations, in some cases, until 
issuers were on the brink of bankruptcy.3 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Congress, and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission faulted analysts for their lack of independence, 
citing investment banking and other conflicts of interest that created incentives 
for analyst optimism. The problem, however, was that analyst conflicts of 
interest were no secret. The existence and effect of analyst conflicts had been 
widely disclosed to the marketplace well before the stock market crash.4 Many 
 
1 The Impact of the Global Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2005) (opening statement of Sen. Richard Shelby, 
Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs) available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/03_05hrg/050703/shelby.htm. 
2 See Lynn E. Turner, Speech at the Third Annual SEC Disclosure & Accounting 
Conference: The State of Financial Reporting Today: An Unfinished Chapter III, ( June 21, 
2001) http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch508.htm (reporting that only .8% of 26,000 analyst 
recommendations surveyed as of March 1, 2000 were sell or strong sell). 
3 See Affidavit in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business 
Law Section 354, at 9−10, In re Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf (hereinafter 
“Merrill Affidavit”) (describing Merrill’s failure to issue sell recommendations, instead 
simply ceasing to cover stocks as their value “plummeted, sometimes all the way to zero”). 
4 For example, in 1992, the Wall Street Journal published a Morgan Stanley 
memorandum instructing its research analysts that the firm policy was “no negative 
comments about our clients.” The Rohrbach Memo: “No Negative Comments,” WALL ST. J., 
July 14, 1992, at A6. In 1995, the Wall Street Journal described the ties between research 
coverage and investment banking. Michael Siconolfi, A Rare Glimpse at How Street Covers 
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publications, and the SEC itself, repeatedly warned investors not to rely on 
analyst recommendations.5 Seemingly, investors relied anyway. 
Investor reliance on recommendations by conflicted analysts may have 
been rational in that the recommendations, although tainted, were the best 
information reasonably available to retail investors. Alternatively, investors 
may have behaved irrationally—discounting the warnings about analyst 
conflicts and persisting in the belief that analysts were releasing research to the 
investing public that was independent and reliable, or recognizing the potential 
conflicts of interest, but over-confidently believing they could assess the effects 
of those conflicts. 
How should regulators determine if investors are not behaving rationally 
and what, if anything, should they do about irrational investor behavior? 
Standard economic analysis assumes that investors respond rationally to 
information, causing the market to incorporate that information into market 
prices.6 A growing behavioral economics literature questions this assumption—
identifying biases, errors, and irrationalities in investor behavior and arguing 
that irrational investor behavior may lead the market to under- or over-react to 
information.7 The literature makes a convincing case for at least some level of 
investor irrationality. 
The problem, however, is identifying the appropriate response to investor 
irrationality. Should regulators attempt to protect investors from bad investment 
decisions that may be the result of irrational behavior? Should they attempt to 
correct investor biases through warnings, educational programs, or qualification 
 
Clients, WALL. ST. J., July 14, 1995, at C1. In 1997, a Forbes magazines series explored the 
effect of analyst conflicts on reported analysis and identified various examples in which 
investment banking business considerations affected analysts’ public statements. Gretchen 
Morgenson, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Dog Ate our Homework, FORBES, Dec. 15, 
1997 at 167. In 1998, Business Week reported that, at the major wall street houses, “every 
analyst has a potential conflict of interest.” Jeffrey M. Laderman, Wall Street’s Spin Game, 
BUS. WK., Oct. 5, 1998, at 148. At the same time, academics were evaluating the impact of 
investment banking relationships on analyst recommendations. See, e.g., Amitabh Dugar & 
Siva Nathan, The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Financial Analysts’ 
Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 12 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 131 (1995). 
See also Jake Ulick, Year of the Scandal, CNN MONEY (Dec. 17, 2002), 
http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/17/news/review_scandals/ (stating in 2002 that “it was long 
argued that analysts’ stock research at big securities firm was tainted by the investment 
banking fees their employers sought and earned”). 
5 See also In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 
243, 266−67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing extensive list of publications warning of analyst 
conflicts as early as 1995). The SEC’s warning, which was issued on July 13, 2001, lagged 
significantly behind media reports of analyst conflicts. SEC, Investor Alert: Analyzing 
Analyst Recommendations,  available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm. 
6 See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 135, 136 (2002) 
(explaining operation of the efficient markets hypothesis). 
7 See, e.g., id. (considering how cognitive biases may influence the structure of 
securities regulation); Stephen Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1026−27 (2000) (exploring the implications of behavioral 
economics for mandatory disclosure). 
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requirements? Does investor irrationality justify paternalism on the part of the 
SEC or the self-regulatory organizations (SROs)? 
The analyst scandals provide a concrete context within which to consider 
this question. The SEC’s initial response to the analyst scandal was to attempt 
to de-bias investors by warning them of analyst conflicts and by requiring 
increased disclosure by the analysts themselves. Spitzer’s approach and the 
analyst independence rules adopted as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley have taken a 
different tack—attempting to reform analyst research to conform to investor 
expectations. Other regulatory alternatives include restricting the information 
that analysts may provide to retail investors or limiting trading by seemingly 
irrational investors. 
The analyst scandals are not unique in offering an example of seemingly 
irrational investor behavior. Although the SEC has defined its mission as the 
protection of retail investors,8 behavioral economics offers limited insights into 
how a regulator should identify and address investor irrationality, particularly 
in the context of private market transactions. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the so-
called analyst scandals. Part II examines the empirical information on the 
nature and effect of analyst recommendations and considers the extent to which 
investor reliance on such recommendations may be irrational. Part III considers 
an analogous example of irrationality—the seeming willingness of investors to 
trade on the basis of chat rooms and other Internet-based sources of 
recommendations. Part IV explores possible regulatory approaches to investor 
irrationality and evaluates the response to the analyst scandal in light of the 
available alternatives. 
II. THE ANALYST SCANDALS 
In June 2001, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer initiated an 
investigation into the stock reports and recommendations issued by research 
analysts.9 The investigation revealed a widespread problem of corruption and 
conflicts of interest, first at Merrill Lynch and subsequently throughout the 
investment banking industry. Among other things, Spitzer found that 
supposedly independent analyst recommendations were frequently the product 
of an investment banking relationship between the analyst’s firm and the issuer, 
or a desire to establish such a relationship.10 Spitzer found evidence that firms 
issued positive public recommendations of companies at the same time that 
internal firm documents disparaged those companies and warned that they were 
“falling apart.”11 Spitzer even found evidence that some investment banks had 
paid their competitors to provide positive coverage of their investment banking 
 
8 See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1073, 1083−84 (2005) (quoting former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as identifying investor 
protection as both the SEC’s legal mandate and his own “top personal priority”). 
9 Merrill Affidavit, supra note 3, at 2. 
10 Id. at 14−16. 
11 Id. at 10−13. 
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clients.12 Spitzer’s investigation spurred further scrutiny into analyst conflicts 
of interest by the SEC, Congress, and the media.13 
The SEC’s investigation revealed additional problems, including failure by 
analysts and their firms to comply with SRO rules regarding disclosure and 
monitoring, analysts trading contrary to their published recommendations, and 
frequent issuance of “booster shot” research reports shortly before the 
expiration of IPO lock-up periods.14 Some of the most damaging revelations 
concerned Citigroup analyst Jack Grubman, who reportedly upgraded his rating 
on AT&T in exchange for assistance in getting his children into an exclusive 
New York preschool.15 
As a result of the investigation, Spitzer, along with the SEC, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), and other regulators, reached a tentative $1.4 billion settlement with 
ten Wall Street firms in December 2002,16 which was finalized on April 28, 
2003.17 The settlement required the firms to revise the structure of their 
operations in order to reduce analyst conflicts of interest. The settlement terms 
specified various mechanisms for insulating analysts from investment banking 
pressure and increasing the transparency and informativeness of analyst 
recommendations.18 In addition, the firms were required to spend a total of 
approximately $432.5 million to provide independent research to their 
customers.19 
Spitzer’s investigation resulted in widespread regulatory reforms. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Regulation AC, which requires 
 
12 Joint Press Release, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement 
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking, April 28, 
2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
13 See, e.g., Thomas S. Mulligan, Amid Criticism, Wall St. Offers Analyst Guidelines, 
L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2001, at 1 (reporting announcement of congressional hearings on 
analyst conflicts of interest and pending SEC investigation). 
14 See Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their Research 
Analysts: Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts, Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs. (July 31, 2001) (written testimony of Laura S. Unger, Acting SEC 
Chair) http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm (summarizing SEC’s findings). 
15 See, e.g., Dan Ackman, Weill-Grubman Dealings were Child’s Play, FORBES.COM, 
Nov. 14, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/11/14/cx_da_1114topnews.html (reporting 
allegations that Grubman’s decision to take a “fresh look at AT&T” was made in exchange 
for Citigroup Chairman Sanford Weill’s help in the form of a $1 million donation by 
Citigroup to the 92nd Street Y); Complaint, SEC v. Jack Benjamin Grubman, S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
28, 2003, ¶¶ 850-103, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18111b.htm (detailing 
allegations). 
16 Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, SEC, N.Y. Attorney 
Gen., NASD, NASAA, and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform 
Investment Practices (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec20b_ 
02.html. 
17 SEC, Statement Regarding Global Settlement Related to Analyst Conflicts of 
Interest, Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042803com.htm. 
18 See SEC, SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (describing settlement terms). 
19 Id. 
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analysts to disclose any conflicts of interest and to certify that their reports 
accurately reflect their personal views.20 Among other things, analysts and their 
firms must disclose the existence of any current or prospective investment 
banking relationships and any compensation or other payments received in 
connection with the report and recommendation. Congress enacted section 501 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires the SEC or the self-
regulatory organizations to adopt rules “reasonably designed to address 
[analyst] conflicts of interest.”21 The statute specifically identifies the need for 
both structural safeguards such as Chinese walls and increased disclosure of 
analyst conflicts. In response to the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, the NYSE 
and NASD adopted a series of rule changes designed to address analyst 
conflicts of interest.22 The rules increase disclosure requirements, limit the 
ability of investment banking personal to evaluate analysts or influence their 
compensation, and require analyst education on ethics and other professional 
responsibility issues. 
In conducting its investigation, Spitzer’s staff reviewed thousands of 
documents and e-mails and deposed numerous witnesses. Some of the most 
egregious false statements and conflicts of interest were revealed in the SEC’s 
complaints and press statements. In addition, hundreds of pages of materials 
from the investigation were released to the public and made available on the 
New York State Attorney General’s Office website. 
The global settlement did not provide for restitution to investors who had 
relied, directly or indirectly, on the analyst reports. As a result, investors filed a 
number of class actions and arbitration cases, seeking to recover for the 
analysts’ false statements, overly optimistic recommendations, and conflicts of 
interest.23 The typical investor claims were based on purchases of technology or 
telecommunications stocks during 1999 or 2000, at the height of the stock 
market bubble. The lawsuits alleged several types of fraudulent conduct. In a 
few cases, investors alleged that the analysts’ reports contained specific 
 
20 Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm. 
21 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
22 Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NASD and the NYSE and Notice of 
Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed Rule 
Change by the NASD and Amendment No. 1 to the Proposed Rule Change by the NYSE 
Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 
(May 10, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm; Self-Regulatory Organizations; 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NYSE Relating to Exchange Rules 344 
(“Supervisory Analysts”), 345A (“Continuing Education for Registered Persons”), 351 
(“Reporting Requirements”) and 472 (“Communications with the Public”) and by the NASD 
Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest and Notice of Filing and Order Granting 
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the NYSE and 
Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the NASD Relating to Research Analyst 
Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48252 (July 29, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm. 
23 See In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 
357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (identifying lawsuits in case at bar as part of a “large group” 
“precipitated” by the New York Attorney General’s report). 
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misrepresentations about the issuers that were the subject of the reports. Thus, 
for example, the WorldCom investors’ complaint against Citigroup, Salomon 
Smith Barney, a Citigroup subsidiary (SSB), and Jack Grubman alleged that 
Grubman learned of a component of WorldCom’s capital expenditure fraud and 
modified the valuation model used in SSB’s reports to conceal the fraud.24 
More commonly, the complaints alleged that the analysts committed fraud 
by knowingly issuing unwarranted positive recommendations and concealing 
their true (negative) opinions about covered issuers. A typical example is the 
complaint in Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros, Inc., which reported an e-mail 
exchange between an analyst and his superior indicating that the analyst both 
knew that the public reports were unwarranted and had attempted to downgrade 
the security three times, but had been prevented from doing so because of 
investment banking reasons.25 At the time of the correspondence, the security 
had dropped in price from $32/share to $4/share, but Lehman was still 
maintaining a $50/share price target.26 
Finally, the complaints alleged that the analysts fraudulently concealed 
their conflicts of interest and that those conflicts undermined the reliability and 
independence of their research. In particular, the complaints alleged that 
analysts issued public reports, recommendations, and price targets that were 
unduly “bullish” in an effort to obtain and maintain investment banking 
business.27 In some cases, analysts allegedly agreed to trade favorable research 
coverage in exchange for investment banking business.28 
Courts have been largely unsympathetic to investor lawsuits against the 
analysts. The vast majority of cases have been dismissed on various grounds 
including statute of limitations,29 absence of loss causation,30 the finding that 
the analyst statements were merely opinions or puffery rather than 
misstatements of fact,31 and lack of scienter.32 In assessing the claims against 
 
24 In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F.Supp. 2d 392, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
25 Fogarazzo v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(describing complaint alleging fraudulent scheme “motivated by the desire to obtain and 
maintain investment banking business for Merrill Lynch.”); La Grasta v. First Union Secs., 
Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2004) (reporting allegations that analyst recommendations 
were motivated by the undisclosed goal of winning investment banking business from 
covered issuer rather than by a desire to identify quality long term investments). 
28 See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 165 (reporting allegations of “the existence of undisclosed 
agreements between Merrill Lynch and 24/7 Media and Interliant to ‘“trade” favorable, 
bullish Analyst Reports for investment banking business directed to Merrill Lynch’”). 
29 See, e.g., In re Salomon Analyst Winstar Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (finding investors were on inquiry notice when company filed for bankruptcy). 
30 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 
351, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
31 See, e.g., In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6345, 
*11−13 (D. Mass. 2005) (rejecting claim that “buy” recommendations were actionable 
statements of opinion). 
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the analysts, the courts observed that analyst conflicts of interest—and 
investment banking conflicts in particular—were well known to the investing 
community for years. Judge Milton Pollack, for example, cited dozens of 
newspaper and magazine articles describing investment banking conflicts and 
the effect that such conflicts had on analysts’ recommendations and other 
public statements.33 Similarly, Judge Richard Holwell dismissed a lawsuit 
against Morgan Stanley on statute of limitations grounds, finding that a Fortune 
magazine cover page article entitled Where Mary Meeker Went Wrong was 
sufficient to put the plaintiff on inquiry notice about analyst conflicts and 
related wrongdoing.34 
Given the widespread disclosure of analyst conflicts, it is difficult to 
understand investors’ claims that they were misled into believing that analysts 
were independent or that their advice was objective. Such claims may simply 
be, as Judge Pollack suggested, an after-the-fact effort to create scapegoats for 
losses resulting from the collapse of the technology bubble.35 Alternatively, 
investors may have failed to respond appropriately to the information about 
analyst conflicts. Whether it was irrational for investors to rely on analyst 
information despite the investment banking conflicts depends, in part, on the 
value of analyst recommendations and reports, a subject addressed in the next 
Part. 
III. EMPIRICAL INFORMATION ON ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Empirical Information 
An extensive economic literature has explored the value of analyst reports 
and recommendations. Although there are some conflicting findings, several 
conclusions emerge from this literature. 
First, analyst recommendations are consistently upwardly biased. Studies 
showed that during the period from 1989 to 1991, buy recommendations were 
seven times more common than sell recommendations.36 The disparity grew 
worse with the bull market. SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner surveyed 
26,000 analyst recommendations as of March 1, 2000 and found that only .8% 
 
32 In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding 
failure adequately to plead falsity and scienter and that, in addition, analyst’s statements 
were protected by the bespeaks caution doctrine). 
33 In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
34 Shah v. Morgan Stanley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20897, *14−15 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
35 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 358 (describing investors as “[s]eeking to 
lay the blame for the enormous Internet Bubble solely at the feet of a single actor, Merrill 
Lynch”). 
36 Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts’ Recommendations Have Investment 
Value?, 51 J. FIN. 137, 142 (1996). 
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were sell or strong sell.37 Interestingly, despite the subsequent market decline 
and the resulting focus on overoptimism by analysts, as of April 2, 2001, sell 
and strong sell recommendations had only risen to 1.3%.38 Eliot Spitzer’s 
investigation of Merrill Lynch revealed that during the period from 1999 to 
2001, Merrill’s Internet research group never rated a stock less than a “3” or 
accumulate on Merrill’s five point scale.39 
Second, despite this bias, investors trade in response to the release of 
analyst reports and recommendations, and the trading is sufficient to generate a 
price response to analyst information.40 Furthermore, the effect is not limited to 
uninformed retail investors. Institutional smart money also responds to 
information released by sell-side analysts.41 A recent study by Paul Ryan and 
Richard Taffler found that sell-side analyst recommendations and earnings 
forecast revisions explain “17.4% of major market-adjusted price changes and 
16.1% of high trading volumes that are triggered by reported news events.”42 
Third, studies show that, apart from the 2000 to 2001 time period, analyst 
recommended stocks outperformed the market.43 Nonetheless, most studies 
show that retail investors are unlikely to benefit from trading on the basis of 
 
37 Lynn E. Turner, Speech at the Third Annual SEC Disclosure & Accounting 
Conference: The State of Financial Reporting Today: An Unfinished Chapter III (June 21, 
2001), http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch508.htm. 
38 Id. 
39 Merrill Affidavit, supra note 3, at 9. 
40 See, e.g., Womack, supra note 36, at 164 (finding “strong evidence that stock prices 
are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes.”); Scott E. Stickel, The 
Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell Recommendations, Sept./Oct. FIN. ANALYSTS J. 
25, 25 (1995) (concluding that “buy and sell recommendations influence stock prices”). 
41 See, e.g., T. Clifton Green, The Value of Client Access to Analyst Recommendations 
1 (2004) (working paper, Emory Univ.), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438725 
(“Institutional investors pay significant amounts to obtain real-time access to brokerage firm 
research through providers such as First Call . . . .”); Paul J. Irvine, Analysts’ Forecasts and 
Brokerage-Firm Trading, 79 ACCT. REV. 125, 126, 147−48 (2004) (clients of brokerage 
firms, including institutional investors, increase trading in response to recommendations and 
forecast revisions of brokerage firm analysts). 
42 Paul Ryan & Richard J. Taffler, What Firm-Specific News Releases Drive 
Economically Significant Stock Returns and Trading Volumes? 2 (working paper, EFMA 
2002 London Meetings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=314880; see also Womack, 
supra note 36, at 164 (finding “strong evidence that stock prices are significantly influenced 
by analysts’ recommendation changes”); Stickel, supra note 40, at 25 (concluding that “buy 
and sell recommendations influence stock prices”). 
43 See, e.g., Brad Barber et al., Can Investors Profit from the Prophets? Security 
Analyst Recommendations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531, 561 (2001) (finding that 
purchasing stocks with most favorable consensus recommendations produces higher returns 
absent transaction costs). Brad Barber et al., Reassessing the Returns to Analysts’ Stock 
Recommendations, Mar./Apr. FIN. ANALYSTS J. 88, 89 (2003) (finding that highly 
recommended stocks underperformed less favored stocks during 2000−2001 time period); 
see also Kent L. Womack, supra note 36 (finding that improved performance persists and is 
not merely a reaction to the announcement of the recommendation). But see Narasimhan 
Jegadeesh et al., Analyzing the Analysts: When do Recommendations Add Value?, 59 J. FIN. 
1083, 1085 (2004) (finding that naïvely following analyst recommendations will not produce 
superior returns and that, for a subset of analyst recommendations, analyst recommended 
stocks actually underperform the market). 
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analyst research. This finding may be the result of transaction costs that dwarf 
the effect of the recommendations.44 Alternatively, it may be the case that the 
smart money has gotten there first—it is common for institutional investors to 
have access to analyst research prior to its release to retail investors. 
An alternative explanation for the inability of retail investors to profit from 
analyst information is irrationality or naïveté. Using trade size as a proxy for 
investor sophistication, several studies have documented differing trading 
responses to analyst information by institutional and retail investors. Michael 
Mikhail, Beverly Walther, and Richard Willis have found, for example, that 
retail investors are more likely to trade in response to analyst upgrades and buy 
recommendations, despite the fact that such recommendations have less 
information value than downgrades and sell recommendations.45 Institutional 
investors, in contrast, account for more of the stock price reaction to the release 
of negative information.46 The study also finds that retail investors are less 
likely than institutions to consider analyst conflicts and incentives in 
responding to recommendations.47 These findings are supported by work by 
Ulrike Malmendier and Devin Shanthikumar.48 Malmendier and Shantikumar 
demonstrate that small investors naïvely respond to analyst recommendations 
and fail to distinguish between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Malmendier 
and Shantikumar argue that their results suggest that large investors respond 
rationally to analyst information but that small investors respond irrationally. 
Similarly, Sarah Bonner, Beverly Walther, and Susan Young find that 
sophisticated investors use information cues to evaluate the quality of analyst 
earnings forecasts and in making investment decisions based on those forecasts; 
unsophisticated investors do not.49 
As a result of these differences, even if analyst information does have 
trading value, it may nonetheless have the effect of inducing sub-optimal 
trading decisions on the part of retail investors. Whether investors are foolish, 
irrational, or the victims of fraud, they are seemingly placing too much 
credence in the buy recommendations and price targets released by analysts. 
The next section examines the extent to which behavioral finance offers insight 
into this investor behavior. 
 
44 See, e.g., Ike Mathur & Amjad Waheed, Stock Price Reactions to Securities 
Recommended in Business Week’s “Inside Wall Street,” 30 FIN. REV. 583, 602 (1995) 
(finding that analyst information is only of value to low transaction cost short term traders, 
such as institutional investors). 




48 Ulrike Malmendier & Devin Shanthikumar, Are Investors Naive About Incentives?, 
working paper 10812 (Sept. 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10812. 
49 Sarah E. Bonner et al., Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Investors’ Reactions to 
Analysts’ Forecast Revisions Conditional on Factors that are Associated with Forecast 
Accuracy (working paper 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=280710. 
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B. Investor Irrationality 
Is investor trading in response to analyst recommendations irrational? One 
can, of course, argue that most investor trading is irrational. Although 
purchasing stocks as a long term investment may be profitable, studies show 
that investors trade too frequently. Trading in the secondary market is, after all, 
a zero sum game, even absent transaction costs.50 Once transaction and 
information costs are incorporated, investor trading results in a net social loss.51 
Commentators have observed that reductions in commission rates and the ease 
of Internet trading have given retail investors unprecedented access to the 
securities markets, leading to an increased number of day traders, momentum 
traders, and noise traders employing trading strategies that are unlikely to be 
profitable on a long term basis.52 
Furthermore, investors’ biases may influence both the frequency and the 
nature of their trading. Commentators have identified a variety of investor 
biases. As Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman observe: 
The list of biases has grown impressively with time, and includes 
overconfidence, the tendency of individuals to overestimate their skills; 
the endowment effect, the tendency of individuals to insist on a higher 
price to sell something they already own than to buy the same item if 
they do not already own it; loss aversion, the tendency for people to be 
risk averse for profit opportunities, but willing to gamble to avoid a loss; 
anchoring, the tendency for people to make decisions based on an initial 
estimate that is later adjusted, but not sufficiently to eliminate the 
influence of the initial estimate; framing, the tendency of people to make 
different choices based on how the decision is framed such as whether it 
is framed in terms of the likelihood of a good outcome or in terms of the 
reciprocal likelihood of a bad outcome; and hindsight, the tendency of 
people to read the present into assessments of the past.53 
Gilson and Kraakman, as well as other commentators, have debated whether 
investor irrationality undercuts the Efficient Capital Market hypothesis, a 
question that depends largely on the extent to which the effects of irrationality 
lead to systemic errors that cannot be corrected through arbitrage. Similarly, 
 
50 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market 
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 622−23 (1995) (explaining how 
stock trading simply transfers the benefits of ownership from one investor to another). 
51 Id. (identifying broker fees and research costs as among the transaction costs of 
trading securities). 
52 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 41, 45 (2001) (describing how access to Internet investing changes investors’ 
trading strategies, the frequency of their trading, and the type of information upon which 
they rely); Laura S. Unger, Speech at the Harvard Club: Does the Internet Empower or Just 
Excite Investors? (Sept. 10, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speecharchive/1999/spch294.htm (explaining how “low prices and easy access” have 
generated increased trading activity and expressing concern that this activity is “hazardous to 
the wealth of investors”). 
53 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty 
Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 724 (2003). 
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investor irrationality can cause prices to deviate from fundamental values even 
if those deviations do not create arbitrage opportunities.54 
This Article does not consider the effect of investor irrationality on overall 
market efficiency or pricing. Rather, the focus of this Article is the relationship 
between investor irrationality and the response by retail investors to analyst 
information. As Gilson and Kraakman acknowledge, even if arbitrage limits the 
effects of investor irrationality on the market, we may nonetheless “care what 
happens to the people whose mistakes are regressed out.”55 
Three types of investor irrationality are particularly significant in 
evaluating reliance on analyst information: overconfidence, anchoring, and 
bounded rationality. Donald Langevoort explains that “there is an increasing 
body of empirical evidence that directly supports investor overconfidence as an 
important trait.”56 In one important study, Bard Barber and Terrance Odean 
evaluate trading practices by individual investors through discount 
brokerages.57 Barber and Odean find extraordinary levels of portfolio turnover 
by individual investors, and those investors who trade most often generate the 
lowest returns.58 After analyzing and rejecting various rational expectations 
explanations for this excessive trading, Barber and Odean conclude that 
“[p]eople are overconfident, and overconfidence leads to too much trading.”59 
Moreover, “[t]hose who trade the most are hurt the most.”60 In another study, 
Barber and Odean find that men exhibit greater overconfidence than women, 
trade more frequently, and realize lower returns.61 
Overconfidence is likely to increase investor reliance on analyst 
recommendations as well. Because overconfident investors trade more 
frequently, they may be most responsive to analyst recommendations. 
Overconfident investors also react more strongly to unreliable information, 
presumably based on an irrational perception of their ability to evaluate the 
information.62 Moreover, research has found that overconfidence can persist 
and dominate rational trading.63 Internet trading, as well as the availability of 
 
54 As Gilson and Kraakman observe, it may not be possible to determine the extent to 
which multiple biases interact or cancel each other out. As a result, although investors sell 
too early because of loss aversion, they may value the security they own more than a 
potential investment because of the endowment effect. The net impact of the two biases on 
equity pricing is therefore indeterminate. See id. at 731−32. 
55 Id. at 733. 
56 Langevoort, supra note 6, at 147. 
57 Brad Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common 
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 799 (2000). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 800. 
60 Id. 
61 Brad Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and 
Common Stock Investment, 116 Q. J. ECON. 261, 289 (2001). 
62 See, e.g., Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders 
Are Above Average, 53 J. FIN. 1887, 1893−94 (1998) (detailing deficiencies in weighting and 
evaluating quality of information). 
63 Albert S. Kyle & F. Albert Wang, Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: 
Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?, 52 J. FIN. 2073, 2073 (1997). 
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equity research on the web, can exacerbate investor overconfidence by giving 
investors an exaggerated sense of control over, and knowledge about, their 
investments.64 In particular, as Barber and Odean warn, the additional 
information available through the Internet can create “an illusion of 
knowledge.”65 
Anchoring is another bias that may lead retail investors to be unduly 
responsive to analyst recommendations.66 Anchoring causes investors to give 
too much weight to an initial reference point in their evaluation and to be 
reluctant to adjust that reference point.67 Anchoring is a factor in loss aversion, 
in which investors are unwilling to sell securities that have declined below the 
initial purchase price.68 With respect to analyst recommendations, anchoring 
attaches a power of suggestion to analyst announcements of price targets. 
Merely by suggesting a price, analysts can cause investors to skew their 
evaluation of stock value toward the announced target because of the undue 
weight given by investors to the target price.69 Moreover, investors may 
continue to credit such targets despite informational developments. Relatedly, 
both price targets and recommendations are highly salient, concrete information 
that is easy for investors to process. Studies show that investors are likely to 
respond more heavily to salient information—“information that stands out and 
captures attention.”70 
The concept of bounded rationality reflects the recognition that people 
have limited cognitive capacities. As a result, people cannot attend to all 
available information or evaluate their choices fully, particularly with respect to 
complex decisions.71 Instead, they engage in satisficing—investing a level of 
effort that will produce a satisfactory, if not optimal, outcome.72 Bounded 
rationality is not, strictly speaking, a bias; it is a rational explanation for 
investor use of heuristics and other short cuts rather than more complete 
 
64 See Barber & Odean, supra note 52, at 42 (detailing the effects of Internet on retail 
investors). 
65 Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). 
66 See Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of 
General Partnerships, 42 CASE W. RES. REV. 1, 16 (1992) (describing anchoring as 
“[p]erhaps the most relevant bias affecting securities investors”). 
67 See, e.g., William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented 
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 344 (1984) 
(describing “anchoring bias”). 
68 See, e.g., Terrance Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. 
Fin. 1775, 1781 (1998) (demonstrating loss aversion in investors). 
69 See, e.g., Edward E. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in 
Probabilistic Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 120, 122−23 (1981) (reporting that 
suggestion of a number to subjects affected their estimates). 
70 Odean, supra note 62, at 1893. 
71 Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral 
Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 272-273 (1959). 
72 Id. at 263. 
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information.73 Bounded rationality explains, at least in part, why retail investors 
with limited time for research may rely more heavily on the easy to understand 
analyst recommendation than on the detailed information contained in the 
analyst’s report. 
IV. INTERNET SECURITIES FRAUD AND INVESTOR IRRATIONALITY 
Bounded rationality, overconfidence, and anchoring affect investor 
responses to information other than that provided by research analysts. Indeed, 
the growing availability and use of the Internet has dramatically increased its 
importance as a source of investor information. Investors obtain information 
from web sites, on-line newsletters, chat rooms, and more. The willingness of 
investors to utilize this information as the basis of trading decisions has led to a 
dramatic growth in Internet securities fraud. Although false statements, pump 
and dump scams, and other manipulative schemes are not a recent innovation—
such actions were the basis for congressional adoption of the federal securities 
laws in 1933 and 1934—the Internet allows fraudsters to reach an 
unprecedented number of investors at an extremely low cost.74 The SEC has 
prosecuted dozens of individuals for using the Internet to engage in 
manipulation and fraud. Indeed, as SEC Director of Enforcement Stephen 
Cutler explained, Internet fraud is so easy that “just about anyone—even a 17-
year-old high school student—can mastermind a securities fraud over the 
Internet.”75 
Perhaps the most shocking example is the case of Jonathan Lebed. Lebed, 
a fifteen-year-old from New Jersey, purchased stock in a number of small 
capitalization companies. After purchasing the stock, he would post hundreds 
of messages to Internet message boards, typically Yahoo! Finance, touting the 
stock. According to the SEC, Lebed used fictitious names and his postings were 
“devoid of substantive content.”76 The postings contained stock price 
predictions as well as statements that the stocks were undervalued and “about 
to ‘take off.’”77 According to the SEC, Lebed’s postings caused the price of the 
stocks to rise dramatically, enabling Lebed to sell his holdings at a substantial 
 
73 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 
101 (1955) (explaining limited knowledge and ability by decision-makers as part of a 
rational choice model). 
74 See, e.g., Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, “You’ve Got Jail”: Current Trends 
in Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Internet Securities Fraud, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 405, 
407 (2001) (“in the past, pump and dump frauds were commonly accomplished in a ‘boiler 
room’ filled with market professionals spreading lies in hundreds of telephone cold calls.”). 
75 Press Release, SEC, SEC Identifies 17-Year-Old High School Student as Internet 
Fraud Artist; Recovers $900,000 in Illegal Proceeds in Account in Costa Rican Casino (Jan. 
7, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/highschoolfraud.htm. 
76 In re Jonathan G. Lebed, SEC Release No. 7,891, Admin. Proc. No. 3-10291 (Sept. 
20, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7891.htm [hereinafter “SEC 
Cease and Desist Order”]. 
77 Id. 
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profit.78 A New York Times magazine article reported that these trades netted 
Lebed almost $800,000 during a six month period.79 The SEC noted that the 
subject companies issued no news or press releases during the time period of 
Lebed’s activity that might have accounted for the increases in price and 
volume.80 
The SEC prosecuted Lebed for manipulation in connection with eleven of 
these transactions.81 According to the SEC, Lebed’s postings had the effect of 
dramatically increasing the price and trading volume of the securities he 
touted.82 In the case of Man Sang Holdings, Inc., the example cited in the 
SEC’s litigation release, “the volume of the stock increased from 71,500 to 
1,879,000 shares, and the price jumped from $2.25 to a high of $5.125” based 
on Lebed’s actions.83 Lebed settled with the Commission, consenting to the 
entry of a cease and desist order against him and disgorging $285,000 of his 
trading profits.84 
The question posed by the SEC’s action against Lebed is how a fifteen-
year-old high school student can persuade investors to purchase stock. If it 
seems irrational for investors to rely on the reports and recommendations 
provided by research analysts, how much less rational is investor reliance on 
information posted anonymously on Internet web sites and chat rooms?85 What 
rational investor would invest in a company touted by “cyber-scofflaws”?86 The 
irrationality of retail investor behavior seems confirmed by the fact that Internet 
postings by an unknown person can cause stock price to double in a matter of 
hours. The SEC stated that Lebed manipulated stock prices and defrauded 
investors. Donald Langevoort explains that Lebed’s influence on the market is 
the result of investor overconfidence.87 
Further analysis of Lebed and his stock analysis, however, demonstrates 
that the line between rational and irrational behavior is not so clear cut. News 
profiles reveal that Lebed was a long term student of the financial markets.88 At 
 
78 Id.  (“The posted messages always caused the price and volume of the touted stocks 
to increase dramatically.”). 
79 Michael Lewis, Jonathan Lebed’s Extracurricular Activities, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 
25, 2001, at 26. 





85 Similarly difficult to understand is the ability of “fraudsters” to induce investor 
trading by leaving phony “wrong number” messages containing stock tips. See SEC, “Wrong 
Numbers” and Stock Tips on Your Answering Machine (Apr. 11, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/wrongnumberscam.htm (warning investors of wrong 
number scam and advising investors that “[i]t is never a good idea to put your hard-earned 
money into a stock on the basis of a hot tip from somebody you don’t know”). 
86 Walker & Levine, supra note 74, at 407 (applying the term to those engaged in 
Internet securities fraud, including Jonathan Lebed). 
87 Langevoort, supra note 56, at 158−59. 
88 See, e.g., CBS News, Pump and Dump, (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
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fourteen he and two friends finished fourth in a national stock picking contest 
for students run by CNBC.89 Lebed’s stock picks were followed not just by 
Internet investors but by his friends and teachers who knew him personally.90 
Subsequent to the settlement with the SEC, Lebed started an Internet website 
that he maintains to date.91 The website contains stock picks, reports of past 
performance, and other information.92 Lebed also publishes a free newsletter 
that he distributes by e-mail. The site’s performance report indicates 
spectacular results by at least some of Lebed’s recent stock picks. Perhaps in 
response to recent reforms in analyst regulation, Lebed’s website states that he 
is not a financial advisor, that he “tries not to own stock in any companies 
profiled on the website” and that any such ownership is disclosed on the site.93 
BusinessWeek Online describes Lebed’s activity as “pumping without 
dumping.”94 The site also contains an extensive legal disclaimer and a copy of 
the SEC consent order.95 
So why not rely on Lebed? From an investor’s perspective, what exactly is 
the difference between relying on Lebed and relying on Jack Grubman or Mary 
Meeker? Media reports and Lebed’s website suggest that Lebed researches the 
companies that he touts. Indeed, the type of information and disclosures 
provided by Lebed appears remarkably similar to the information provided by 
professional analysts, albeit more limited, and include descriptions of the 
company’s business, recent developments, and reports of significant ownership 
interests or transactions in the company’s stock. 
An investor might question the extent of Lebed’s research or knowledge 
about the firms he covers, but one might raise similar questions about 
professional analysts. Research analysts are under no legal requirement to do a 
particular level of research or investigation to support their analysis, nor are 
there any regulatory requirements or certifications needed to provide general 
analysis and information to the investing public.96 Moreover, the fact that an 
 
stories/2000/10/19/60minutes/main242489.shtml (explaining that Lebed had been investing 
in the stock market since he was thirteen and had, “for someone who has just turned 16 . . . a 
relatively long track record for picking stocks”). 
89 Id. 
90 Lewis, supra note 79, at 30. 
91 Lebed.biz can be found at http://www.lebed.biz/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2006). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (follow “FAQs” hyperlink). 
94 Gary Weiss, This Stock Whiz Kid Stays in the Picture, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Apr. 7, 
2003, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_14/b3827065_mz020.htm. 
95 Lebed.biz, http://www.lebed.biz/index.htm (follow “Legal Disclaimer” hyperlink, or 
follow “SEC Consent Order” hyperlink, both located at the bottom of every page). 
96 See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1056−74 (2003) (describing regulation of 
securities analysts). Analysts are generally exempt from the more stringent requirements of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 because they do not provide direct personalized 
investment advice to specific clients. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) 
(finding Investment Advisers Act did not apply to the publication of non-personalized 
investment advice in newsletters). See also Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be 
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analyst is knowledgeable about a firm or an industry does not make that 
analyst’s recommendations reliable, as was evidenced by hindsight evaluation 
of Jack Grubman’s recommendations. Recent actions by regulators seem to 
suggest that independence from conflicts of interests, particularly investment 
banking conflicts—is among the most important factors in assuring the 
reliability of analyst information.97 Like the independent analysts, who have 
been the beneficiaries of recent regulatory efforts and the Spitzer/SEC 
settlement, Lebed is certainly free from investment banking and brokerage 
conflicts, although, as with analysts, it is unclear that any source of investment 
information is free of all conflicts of interest.98 Moreover, many firms that 
provide so-called independent analysis trade covered securities on a proprietary 
basis, as Lebed did.99 
In sum, the behavior of information sources and market participants 
suggests that, even if investors are not fully rational, it is difficult to 
characterize particular investment decisions as irrational or inappropriate. In a 
market in which prices can and do deviate from fundamental value, in a market 
where investor sentiment plays an important role, in a market that functions 
like the famous Keynes beauty contest, it is hard to decide what information 
constitutes a rational basis for trading. Investors may lose money when trading 
on the basis of fundamentals, or make money by following the length of 
women’s skirts. The difficulty of identifying appropriate and inappropriate 
bases for trading decisions suggests a challenge for regulators in attempting to 
reduce irrational investor behavior. The next section considers actual and 
potential regulatory responses to investor irrationality. 
 
Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51523, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 
2005) (excepting from the Investment Advisers Act certain broker-dealers who provide 
investment advice incidental to brokerage services). 
97 See, e.g., Global Research Analyst Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of William H. 
Donaldson, Chairman, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts050703whd 
.htm (describing structural reforms of the Global Research Settlement as “designed to 
insulate research analysts from pressures by investment banking”) (hereinafter “Donaldson 
Testimony”). 
98 See generally Stephen Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher 
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 284−86 (2003) 
(describing various business relationships that can compromise the objectivity of so-called 
independent analysts). 
99 See, e.g., Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research is Fuzzier Than Ever; 
‘Independent’ Label Becomes a Mantra After the Crackdown, But Conflicts Have Emerged, 
WALL ST. J. Apr. 26, 2004, at C1 (describing trading by analyst Thomas Brown’s Hedge 
Fund in securities touted to investors on his web site). NASD and NYSE rules require 
minimal disclosure of such trading typically provided by firms through boilerplate 
statements. Firms that are not SRO members need not even make such disclosure. See, e.g., 
Argus Research Company Website Disclaimer, http://www.argusresearchgroup.com/ 
default.asp?template=/templates/arguss_terms.html (stating “Argus officers, employees, 
agents and/or affiliates may have positions in stocks discussed in this report.”). 
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V. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO INVESTOR IRRATIONALITY 
If retail investors are relying inappropriately in making investment 
decisions due to overconfidence, anchoring, bounded rationality, or other 
biases, should regulators respond, and, if so, how? A central objective of the 
federal securities laws was protection of the retail investor, and the SEC 
continues to view investor protection as its primary goal. Can the SEC identify 
irrational investor behavior, and, if so, what, if any, regulatory response is 
appropriate? 
Disclosure is the response most consistent with the structure of the federal 
securities laws and the SEC’s general practice in regulating the securities 
markets. Disclosure directed at irrational investor behavior can take two forms. 
One approach is to require disclosure specifically targeted at investor 
irrationalities. For example, if the SEC believes that investors suffer from the 
representative bias and unduly emphasize past returns,100 it can require mutual 
funds to disclose that past returns do not guarantee future performance.101 
Similarly, if the SEC believes that investors irrationally fail to reflect analyst 
incentives in their evaluation of analyst recommendations, it can mandate that 
analysts disclose investment banking relationships and other conflicts of 
interest. 
A second type of disclosure would provide investors with information 
about rational and irrational investment decisions, common biases, and 
methods for overcoming or counteracting those biases. Several commentators 
have suggested that investor irrationality could be overcome by some form of 
investor education. Larry Cunningham, for example, describes a program of 
investor education that would “consist of identifying and describing the set of 
biases and introducing steps that can reduce their adverse effects.”102 Jim Fanto 
proposes including, as part of his comprehensive investor education program, 
education about “major psychological factors that can adversely affect 
investing decision-making.”103 
The primary difficulty with disclosure as a regulatory response is that there 
is limited evidence that disclosure is effective in overcoming investor biases. 
As Steve Choi and Adam Pritchard observe, “We doubt that disclosure is the 
 
100 See, e.g., Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. 
FIN. 1589 (1998) (finding that mutual fund investors select funds that performed well in the 
prior period); Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 815, 844 (2001) (arguing that “investors may act with ‘hindsight bias,’ placing too 
much weight on past performance in projecting future performance”). 
101 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Amends Mutual Fund Advertising Rules, 
Proposes New Rules and Amendments for Fund of Funds Investments, (Sept. 24, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-122.htm (describing SEC adoption of new mutual fund 
advertising rules that “[r]equire fund advertisements that contain performance information to 
include disclosure that past performance does not guarantee future results”). 
102 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 792 (2002). 
103 James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and 
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 133 (1998). 
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optimal regulatory strategy if most investors suffer from cognitive biases.”104 
Disclosure is most problematic as a response to investor overconfidence. As 
Donald Langevoort notes, overconfident investors will simply assume that the 
warnings are meant for someone else, not for them.105 
A more paternalistic regulatory approach could limit permitted trading by 
unsophisticated or irrational investors. Investors might be required to 
demonstrate a minimum level of knowledge or rationality in order to make 
certain types of trading decisions or to purchase certain types of investment 
products. To a certain extent, the SEC already takes this approach, albeit with 
wealth serving as a proxy for sophistication, through rules that limit the sales of 
certain unregistered securities to qualified or accredited investors.106 The NYSE 
imposes a modest, although largely unenforced, version of this approach with 
respect to options trading by requiring member firms to have a reasonable basis 
for believing that customers have sufficient understanding of options and their 
risks before recommending option transactions to them.107 Steve Choi has 
argued for a broader type of certification program in which investors, before 
trading, would have to obtain a license from the SEC by demonstrating a 
specified level of investment knowledge.108 Alternatively certain classes of 
investors could be barred from types of trading that are viewed as particularly 
risky, such as day trading.109 
 
104 Stephen Choi & A. C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 22 (2003). 
105 See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 
880 (1995). 
106 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based 
Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 310 (2000) (describing requirements of SEC Regulation D 
and SEC Rule 144). 
107 The full text of NYSE Rule 723 is as follows: 
No member organization or member, allied member or employee of such member 
organization shall recommend to a customer an opening transaction in any option contract 
unless the person making the recommendation has a reasonable basis for believing, at the 
time of making the recommendation, that the customer has such knowledge and experience 
in financial matters that he may reasonably be expected to be capable of evaluating the risks 
of the recommended transaction, and is financially able to bear the risks of the recommended 
position in the option contract. 
2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 2723, at 4560 (1990). 
108 Choi, supra note 106, at 311−12. 
109 Michael P. Kailus, Note, Do Not Bet on Unilateral Prohibition of Internet Gambling 
to Eliminate Cyber-Casinos, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1074−75 (1999) (arguing that “[d]ay 
trading appears more closely related to traditional forms of gambling than traditional forms 
of investing” and questioning the absence of public discussion calling for its prohibition). 
The SEC has approved NASD and NYSE rules that “establish special maintenance margin 
requirements for customers who engage in day trading, and . . . specify minimum equity 
requirements and buying power limitations for customers who demonstrate a pattern of day 
trading.” Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Margin Requirements for 
Day Trading; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments 
No. 1 to each Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 44,009, 66 Fed. Reg. 
13,608 (Mar. 6, 2001). 
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There are two obvious problems. First, barring investors from certain types 
of trading may leave those investors with inferior alternatives. For example, 
even an investor who consistently underperforms the market when investing in 
equities may do better than he would by putting that money into a savings 
account at a bank. Second, regulatory restrictions on direct trading by retail 
investors may result in those investors using intermediaries. It is unclear, 
however, that intermediaries offer meaningful investor protection. Rather, there 
is continued evidence that broker-dealers, mutual fund operators, and the like 
are ineffective gatekeepers.110 Understanding the agency costs and other issues 
associated with investing through an intermediary may be more complex than 
investing directly in equities.111 For example, studies suggest that market forces 
do not operate effectively to keep mutual fund fees in check; one study found 
that 80% of investors misguidedly believed that higher cost mutual funds 
typically have better returns.112 Moreover, broker-recommended mutual 
funds—typically sold to the least sophisticated investors—were found to have 
higher fees and expenses and to underperform those sold directly to 
investors.113 
A higher level of paternalism would involve regulators directly prohibiting 
certain actions that, in the view of regulators, demonstrate a high level of 
irrationality. The SEC could, for example, prohibit analysts who have certain 
types of relationships with their firm’s investment banking business, from 
releasing recommendations to investors.114 The SEC could designate the use of 
certain types of information, such as “strong buy recommendations” or price 
targets, as potentially misleading, thereby increasing analyst liability exposure. 
The SEC could prohibit day trading or bar retail investors from trading via the 
Internet. 
 
110 See, e.g., Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: 
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, and Int’l Sec., Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (testimony of Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts110303pfroral.htm (describing abusive practices 
engaged in by mutual funds and regulatory efforts aimed at addressing those practices); 
Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds: Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other Practices that 
Harm Investors: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. On Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, and Int’l Sec., 
S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 108th Cong. (2004), (testimony 
of Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. Att’y Gen.), http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/012704spitzer.pdf 
(testifying that mutual funds charge excessive advisory fees at the expense of their 
investors). 
111 See, e.g., Ronald Wilcox, Bargain Hunting or Star Gazing? How Consumers 
Choose Mutual Funds, 76 J. BUS. 645 (2003) (finding surprisingly frequent errors among 
more sophisticated investors). 
112 Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mutual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics, Investor 
Knowledge and Sources of Information, 7 FIN. SERV. REV. 301, 310 (1998). 
113 Daniel B. Bergstresser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the 
Mutual Fund Industry (March 15, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=616981. 
114 Essentially, the SEC has done so by barring certain relationships between research 
analysts and the investment banking operations of their firms. 
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Apart from the obvious fact that paternalistic regulations would 
dramatically reduce investor freedom,115 regulators may not be able to 
distinguish clearly between rational and irrational trading. Studies have shown 
that stock prices rise with hemlines,116 but trading on the basis of skirt lengths 
is not consistent with the fundamental approach advocated by the SEC.117 The 
promotion of non-IB affiliated analysts at the same time that the SEC was 
publicly condemning the activities of Jonathan Lebed suggests that regulators 
may not fully understand what should motivate investor trading. Studies show 
that the information released by affiliated analysts is more informative, but 
more biased.118 Consequently, by reducing analyst conflicts of interest, 
regulators may reduce irrational trading, but at the cost of reducing the quantity 
or quality of information flow to retail investors who are unwilling or unable to 
pay for quality independent research. 
Finally, regulators could increase the costs of information, the costs of 
trading, or both. Lynn Stout and others have suggested that irrationally 
excessive trading could be reduced by a government imposed tax on trading or 
a stock transfer tax.119 Investor speculation could also be reduced through 
higher brokerage commissions.120 Regulators can impose extra fees on certain 
types of transactions that present a particular risk of abuse, such as penny stock 
 
115 See Paul Mahoney, Is There a Cure for “Excessive” Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 
740 (1995) (“Restricting investors’ freedom in order to mitigate the consequences of their 
irrational choices should be a policy of last resort.”). 
116 See, e.g., Donald H. Dunn & Gary Weiss, Hemlines, Headlines, Holidays: Wall 
Street’s Odd Indicators, BUS. WK., Sept. 7, 1987, at 116 (describing the so-called “hemlines 
indicator”); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 157−59 (2003) 
(acknowledging some correlation between skirt lengths and stock prices but arguing that 
hemlines cannot be used to predict future prices). 
117 The economic evidence supporting the persistence of other market anomalies is 
stronger. See e.g., Rolf W. Banz, The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of 
Common Stocks, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3−4 (1981) (identifying small firm price effect); Richard 
Thaler, Anomalies: The January Effect, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 197, 199 (Summer 1987) 
(discussing the “January effect”); Kenneth R. French, Stock Returns and the Weekend Effect, 
8 J. FIN. ECON. 55, 56, 68 (1980) (documenting reduced returns over weekends). 
118 See, e.g., John Jacob et al., Do Analysts at Independent Research Firms Make Better 
Earnings Forecasts?, working paper (July 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=434702 (finding 
that, during the bull market period of 1998−2001, investment banking affiliated analysts 
made more accurate earnings forecasts than non-affiliated analysts). 
119 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 50, at 699−702 (discussing stock transfer tax); Lawrence 
H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious 
Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 261, 268 (1989) (proposing 
stock transactions tax); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term 
Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 101, 113 (1989) (arguing in favor of stock transfer tax). 
Indeed, John Keynes advocated such a tax in 1935 in an effort to curb speculative trading. 
See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND 
MONEY 160 (1964) (advocating stock transfer tax). 
120 Studies show that the reduction in brokerage commissions due to the SEC’s 
abolition of fixed commissions was correlated with an increase in trading volume. See, e.g., 
Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J. L. 
& ECON. 273 (1984) (finding increases in volume ranging from 30 to 100 percent). 
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trading or pattern day trading. And regulators can, and in fact do, provide tax 
incentives designed to reduce speculation and increase long term investment.121 
Increasing the transaction costs of trading obviously creates a cost by 
reducing liquidity in the market. Increased transaction costs can reduce market 
efficiency by limiting the ability of investors to capture the value of 
information through trading. Charles Jones and Paul Seguin found that the 
reduction in transaction costs caused by the elimination of fixed brokerage 
commissions significantly reduced stock price volatility.122 In addition, 
increased transaction costs burden all investors, not merely those who trade 
irrationally. A net social welfare analysis evaluating the consequences of 
increasing trading costs would be extremely difficult. 
Regulators have taken several steps to address irrational investor trading in 
reliance on tainted or biased analyst recommendations. Overall, the approach 
has evolved from one of disclosure and investor education to an increasing 
degree of paternalism. 
The SEC’s initial response focused on investor education. In 2002, the 
SEC posted an investor alert on its website,123 warning investors about analyst 
conflicts of interest and the potential effect of such conflicts on analyst 
recommendations.124 The alert, which has since been modified and expanded, 
explains the recently expanded SRO disclosure requirements, cautions 
investors about analyst conflicts, and advises investors about additional ways to 
identify potential conflicts.125 In 2003, the SEC adopted Regulation Analyst 
Certification or AC.126 Regulation AC requires analysts to include certain 
certifications and disclosures, as part of their research reports.127 The 
requirements include a statement that the analyst believes the report accurately 
reflects his or her personal views, and disclosure of any payments received by 
the analyst in connection with the report. 
Regulators also increased the disclosure requirements applicable to 
research reports and recommendations, presumably in an effort to increase 
information flow to investors. In 2002, the SEC approved rule changes by the 
SROs that require disclosure of financial ties between investment banks with 
whom analysts are affiliated and issuers of covered securities, such as whether 
 
121 Existing tax law, for example, provides a maximum tax rate of 15% on capital gains 
earned on stock held for at least a year, a substantial reduction over the 35% rate applicable 
to ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) (applying general 
15% maximum tax rate to individual capital gains); I.R.C. § 1(i)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 
2005) (applying maximum individual income tax rate of 35%). 
122 Charles M. Jones & Paul J. Seguin, Transaction Costs and Price Volatility: 
Evidence from Commission Deregulation, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 736 (1997). 
123  SEC, Analyzing Analyst Recommendations supra note 5. 
124 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 96, at 1068 (describing SEC’s initial posting of the 
alert). 
125 SEC, Analyzing Analyst Recommendations supra note 5. 
126 Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm. 
127 The Regulation also mandates disclosure in connection with public appearances by 
research analysts. Id. 
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the bank has provided investment banking services to the issuer in connection 
with a public offering or otherwise.128 The SRO rules also require disclosure of 
certain ownership positions by analysts and their firms in covered securities as 
well as explanations of the terms used in rating stocks and information about 
the percentage of ratings per term, and comparisons of historical performance 
with the firm’s ratings.129 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the SRO rules, and the Global Research Settlement go 
beyond disclosure however and impose structural limitations to separate 
research analysts from investment banking operations. Section 501 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC or the SROs to promulgate rules to 
address analyst conflicts of interest.130 In addition to requiring increased 
disclosure of analyst conflicts, the Act identified specific structural safeguards 
such as Chinese walls.131 The SROs have adopted rules that insulate research 
analysts from investment banking influence by, inter alia, prohibiting analysts 
from participating in the solicitation of investment banking business, barring 
firms from tying analyst compensation to investment banking revenues, and 
limiting contact between analysts and issuers.132 The rules impose quiet periods 
around offerings and lock-up expirations during which analysts may not issue 
research reports. The rules also impose a variety of restrictions on analyst 
trading, including prohibiting analysts from trading contrary to the position 
advocated in their last published report.133 The Global Research Settlement 
requires the investment banks participating in the Settlement to separate 
research from investment banking in a similar manner to the SRO rules.134 In 
addition, the Settlement requires the defendant firms to provide their customers 
with independent research for a period of five years.135 
 
128 NASD and NYSE Rulemaking, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg. 
34,968 (May 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm (“First SRO 
Release”). 
129 Id. 
130 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
131 Id., 116 Stat. at 792. 
132 Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Exchange Rules 344 (“Supervisory Analysts”), 
345A (“Continuing Education for Registered Persons”), 351 (“Reporting Requirements”), 
and 472 (“Communications with the Public”), and by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analysts Conflicts of Interest, and Notice of Filing and 
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Changes 
by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change 
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst 
Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48252, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875 (Aug. 4, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm; First SRO Release, supra 
note 128. 
133 Id. The rules also, for the first time, impose registration, qualification, and 
continuing education requirements on research analysts. 
134 See Donaldson Testimony, supra note 97 (describing structural reforms required by 
the settlement). 
135 Id. The Settlement also set aside $80 million to fund investor education. In May 
2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that the federal investor education program had all but 
collapsed and that the state program had dispersed almost none of the allocation. Deborah 
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The regulatory changes addressed to analyst conflicts of interest are 
designed to address irrational investor reliance on analyst research by making 
such reliance rational. By requiring analyst independence, imposing 
qualification requirements, and dictating a variety of details in the analyst 
report, the regulations appear to make analyst research a reliable source of 
investor information. Having determined that investors cannot be dissuaded by 
using and relying on analyst research despite the fact that the research may be 
tainted or biased, regulators have responded by attempting to remove the 
taint.136 
Assuming, for purposes of discussion, that regulators have correctly 
identified investor reliance on biased analyst research as irrational, the 
regulatory response of mandating independence is problematic. Restricting 
analyst conflicts of interest is likely to reduce the quality and quantity of 
research available to retail investors.137 Prohibiting analyst conflicts of interest 
reduces the ability of investment banks and brokerages from subsidizing 
research costs through other business revenues.138 Quality research is both 
costly and difficult to sell on a stand-alone basis.139 To the extent it can be sold, 
the purchasers will be institutional customers. Indeed, a number of independent 
analysts declined the opportunity to have their research provided to brokerage 
firm customers as part of the Global Settlement because public dissemination 
of their research would lower its value to their institutional clients.140 In short, 
regulators cannot mandate that retail investors receive high quality research for 
free; and if investment banks and other suppliers cannot subsidize the cost of 
providing research to retail investors, they will simply not provide it. 
More problematic is the question of whether regulators have correctly 
identified investor irrationality. Through their recent reforms, regulators have 
 
Solomon, Investor Education Spurs Looming Duel Between US, States, WALL ST. J., May 
26, 2005 at C1. 
136 Although it is unclear that this strategy can improve the quality of analyst research 
there is some preliminary evidence that it may be effective in reducing the extent of the bias. 
See Ohad Kadan et al., Are Analysts Still Biased? Evidence from the Post “Global 
Settlement” Period, at 4 (working paper 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=591227 (finding that 
the Global Settlement had a significant effect in reducing relative optimism of investment 
bank affiliated analysts). 
137 See Jill E. Fisch, The Analyst as Fiduciary: A Misguided Quest for Analyst 
Independence? (working paper 2005) (copy on file with author), (arguing that mandated 
independence will reduce retail investor access to information). It will also reduce market 
information about smaller issuers. See id. (detailing reductions in research coverage of 
smaller issuers in response to increased analyst regulation). 
138 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 98, at 311−12 (identifying concern that eliminating 
cross-subsidization will cause financial firms to reduce or eliminate funding of research 
coverage). 
139 See id. at 285−86 (identifying the public good problem with selling research on a 
stand-alone basis). 
140 See, e.g., Thor Valdmanis, Few Believe $1.4B deal will change Wall Street, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 29, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/ 
2003-04-29-settle-cover_x.htm (quoting several independent firms as stating that their 
research was inappropriate for retail investors or that participation in the settlement would 
detract from the value of their research and cost them institutional clients). 
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interposed themselves into the position of gatekeepers, deciding the types of 
conflicts and level of independence that make analyst research suitable for the 
investing public.141 Notably, despite the range of incentives and biases that can 
affect the accuracy of securities information provided to the investing public, 
the SEC has focused almost exclusively on investment banking conflicts of 
interest.142 At the same time, the SEC has championed so-called independent 
research even though non-investment banking-affiliated analysts may also be 
subject to a variety of conflicts.143 It is unlikely that Congress and the SEC are 
particularly well suited to evaluate the quantity of knowledge that qualifies an 
investor to participate in the securities markets or to judge the quality of 
information that investor may consider.144 With respect to investment banking 
conflicts, for example, regulators have required investment banks to sever ties 
between investment banking and research, despite empirical evidence showing 
that IB-affiliated research may be more informative.145 
Even disclosure-based approaches to potentially irrational investor 
behavior impose costs.146 Importantly, however, once regulators move beyond 
disclosure into substantive efforts to constrain irrational behavior, regulation 
imposes substantial costs on the securities markets. In the case of analyst 
regulation, both the benefits and the costs of recent reform efforts have yet to 
be evaluated. When regulation is directed at reducing irrational behavior, an 
evaluation of its effectiveness must also consider the rationality of the response. 
Bounded rationality may cause people to fail to appreciate the risk of climbing 
a ladder, but stern warnings of the dangers associated with ladders may lead to 
an overreaction in which people forsake ladders altogether in favor of sitting in 
the dark when a light bulb burns out.147 
This issue is of particular concern with respect to regulations aimed at 
inducing investors to act more rationally in their reliance on securities 
information. If analyst research is untainted by investment banking conflicts, 
 
141 See Pritchard, supra note 8, at 1078−92 (identifying a variety of shortcomings in the 
ability of the SEC and Congress to implement appropriate investor protection regulation). 
142 Thus, for example, brokers typically determine analyst compensation on the basis of 
commission revenues generated by that analyst’s research. The SEC has not prohibited this 
practice despite its potential to bias analyst recommendations. 
143 See Fisch, supra note 137 (examining potential conflicts by purportedly independent 
analysts); Choi & Fisch, supra note 98, at 284−85 (considering extent to which non-
investment banking affiliated analysts are independent). 
144 See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 173 (warning that the SEC has not fully studied the 
nature of investor behavior or the factors that influence investment decisions); see also Choi 
& Pritchard, supra note 104, at 71−72 (warning that regulators may suffer from their own 
behavioral biases that limit their ability to respond appropriately to investor biases). 
145 See, e.g., Amanda Cowen et al., What Types of Analyst Firms Make More 
Optimistic Forecasts? (working paper 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=436686 (finding that 
analysts who work for brokerage only firms are more optimistically biased as well as less 
accurate than investment banking affiliated analysts). 
146 See Pritchard, supra note 8, at 1088 (criticizing the SEC’s failure to obtain empirical 
evidence to support its disclosure requirements). 
147 Somewhere in there, there must be a joke about the number of irrational actors that 
it takes to change a light bulb. 
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that does not mean that investors should buy when an analyst says buy and sell 
when an analyst says sell. Obviously, the independence of an analyst is no 
guarantee of the accuracy of his or her research, and the accuracy of research is 
similarly no guarantee of future performance. Moreover, the suitability of an 
investment for any particular investor depends on a variety of factors, including 
the investor’s time horizon, risk profile and other investments. 
At the same time, if investor access to analyst research is reduced because 
of the costs of regulation, what information sources will replace that research? 
Existing evidence demonstrates that investors remain surprisingly willing to 
trade securities on the basis of chat room postings, anonymous phone 
messages, and other shockingly unreliable sources of information. Moreover, 
these sources lack both the transparency and the reputational constraints that, 
even at the height of the bull market, arguably limited the distorting effect of 
analyst research. Jack Grubman is no longer issuing information to the public 
about telecommunications companies. Jonathan Lebed continues to do so. Are 
investors better off? 
These questions suggest that regulators should give further consideration 
to an additional regulatory alternative: do nothing and allow irrational investors 
to bear the consequences of their trading decisions. In questioning the ability of 
investors to demonstrate a sufficient casual nexus between analyst 
misstatements and omissions and the investors’ subsequent trading losses, the 
Second Circuit noted the significant policy implications of the issue.148 The 
Second Circuit’s concern (and implied resolution of that concern in favor of the 
defendant analysts) may be analogized to the traditional use of proximate cause 
in common law torts—as a policy-based tool for limiting the scope of a 
defendant’s legal responsibility.149 The reluctance of federal courts to impose 
securities fraud liability on research analysts may reflect the policy judgment 
that regulation cannot enforce the mandate that investment information be 
reliable, and that government efforts to assess information reliability are 
doomed to failure. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Academics are only beginning to understand the nature and effect of 
behavioral biases. Applying this understanding to the securities markets 
presents a particular challenge because of the difficulty in clearly distinguishing 
between rational and irrational trading in markets in which investor reaction to 
information—rather than the information itself—plays a substantial role in 
determining prices. 
 
148 Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that “the issue 
presented in this case is . . . significant, because the application of the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine to opinions expressed by research analysts would extend the potentially coercive 
effect of securities class actions to a new group of corporate and individual defendants—
namely, to research analysts and their employers.”). 
149 See W. PAGE KEETON, et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 
1984) (arguing that proximate cause deals with the question of legal responsibility and, as 
such, is “not a question of causation, or even a question of fact . . . .”). 
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The so-called analyst scandals exemplify the problem. Was analyst over-
optimism justified by the irrational exuberance of the late 1990s technology 
bubble? Or did analyst recommendations fuel the bubble and cause prices to 
spin out of control? And whatever the explanation, is the regulatory response of 
imposing greater separation between investment banking and research likely to 
improve the quality of investor decision-making? 
More generally, the post-Enron regulation of research analysts illustrates 
the difficulty in fashioning an appropriate regulatory response to irrational 
behavior. If, as in the case of securities trading, there are existing market 
checks on irrationality, regulators should think carefully about the costs and 
benefits of intervening in that market. 
 
